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Both product differentiation through quality and capacity commitment have been shown
to relax price competition. However, they have not been considered simultaneously. To this
end we consider a three stage game where 9rms choose quality then commit to capacity and
9nally compete in price. We show that in equilibrium, 9rms differentiate their products less
than if they were not able to commit to limited capacities. This is because they are able
to enjoy Cournot pro9ts at the stage where capacity are chosen. Furthermore if the cost of
quality is low, capacity pre-commitment completely eliminates the incentives to differentiate.
JEL codes: L13
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It is well-known since Gabszewicz & Thisse (1979)Es seminal contribution that quality differenti-
ation offers a powerful way out of the Bertrand paradox. Many scholars have further elaborated
on their pioneering work and today a robust Gprinciple of differentiationG prevails in the liter-
ature studying vertically differentiated industries. As nicely summarized in Shaked & Sutton
(1983), 9rms are indeed likely to Grelax price competition through product differentiationG.
Interestingly enough, capacity commitment also has the virtue of relaxing price competition.
The seminal contribution in this area is Kreps & Scheinkman (1983) who showed how capac-
ity commitment may be instrumental in sustaining Cournot outcomes in pricing games. The
strategic value of capacities has then been widely studied though almost exclusively in markets
for non-differentiated goods.
within the standard model of vertical differentiation,
capacity commitment is more effective than quality differentiation as a mean of relaxing price
competition.
rms
end up selling homogeneous products in equilibrium.
Casual observation suggests that many industries exhibit both product differentiation through
quality and limited capacities in the short run. It is hard to see however which of the two aspects
governs 9rmsE behavior at the price competition stage. In other words, we ignore if 9rmsE in-
centives with respect to quality choices are dependent on the possibility to commit to capacities
or the reverse. If either is true one may wonder whether these instruments are complements or
substitutes in relaxing price competition. Our aim in the present paper is to address this issue
which does not seem to have been previously studied neither theoretically nor empirically.
Our main result summarizes as follows:
To show this, we consider a three stage game where 9rms choose their quality
level, then their level of production capacities and 9nally compete in prices. In our model, the
possibility to commit in capacities in the second stage tends to destroy much of the incentives
to choose different qualities in the 9rst stage. In particular, when quality costs are low,
This result may seem surprising at 9rst sight, in particular because it runs against the well-
established Gprinciple of differentiationG. In fact our 9nding is quite intuitive. Eaton & Harrald
(1992) or Ireland (1987) have already shown that under quantity competition, 9rms are not
inclined to differentiate in quality unless this allows to reduce sunk costs. In particular, under
quantity competition, when there are no costs to quality upgrading, choosing the best available
quality is a dominant strategy for all 9rms. When quality is costly, differentiation arises in
equilibrium because it is more pro9table to select a lower quality in order to incur lower sunk
costs if the other 9rm has already chosen the highest quality.
In our model, the main effect of capacity commitment is precisely to transform the initial
pricing game into a quantity game. More precisely, the reduced form of each 9rmEs payoff at
the quality stage are exactly equivalent to the Cournot payoffs. Therefore, the no-differentiation
outcome naturally follows when quality costs are low. When quality improvement is costly, the
possibility to commit in capacities systematically induces less differentiation in equilibrium as
compared to the no-commitment case. Note that this result should not be viewed as invalidating
the idea of vertical differentiation. It underlines however that the principle of quality (vertical)
differentiation, as opposed to variety (horizontal) differentiation, is crucially rooted in asym-
metries of costs rather than on a willingness to relax competition. In this last respect indeed,
quality differentiation is clearly supplemented by capacity commitment.
Incidentally, the previous 9nding suggests that the standard Cournot outcomes (i.e. for
homogeneous goods) can be sustained as subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes, thereby repli-
cating Kreps & Scheinkman (1983)Es result within an enlarged game. We will show that this
is only partially true. Cournot outcomes will indeed obtain as subgame perfect equilibrium
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Setting a 9nite common upper bound to qualities and consumers reservation price is a potential limitation of
our model. We show in the next section that it is not a severe restriction.
outcomes but many other outcomes, including the fully collusive ones will be sustainable as
well.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model and recall of the equi-
librium of a quality-price game when production capacities are in9nite. We then introduce the
capacity commitment stage in section 3 and solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium. We estab-
lish at this step that capacity commitment induces a marked tendency towards no differentiation.
This leads to analyze the behavior of our model at the no-differentiation limit (homogeneous
goods) in section 4. Finally section 5 concludes.
ConsumersE preferences are set according to the simpli9ed framework of Mussa & Rosen (1978)
as popularized by Tirole (1988). Consumers are characterized by a Gtaste for qualityG which
is uniformly distributed in the interval. Furthermore consumers have unit demand for
the good and make their choice according to the indirect utility function for
. Not consuming yields a utility normalized to .
We consider a three-stage game. In stage 1, 9rms choose quality levels
at a cost . Observe that when is large the cost of choosing a positive quality becomes
negligible. The incentives to differentiate are then exclusively related to the price competition
mechanism. In stage 2, 9rms have the opportunity to commit to capacities before competing
in price in the last stage. The capacity cost is small but positive. We retain at this step the
framework proposed by Dixit (1980) within a quantity competition model and recently used by
Maggi (1996) for price competition. The installed capacity allows 9rm to produce up
to at constant marginal cost whereas producing beyond capacity is possible at a constant
unit cost . Formally, the relevant marginal cost at the price competition stage is given by
if
if
for
We assume w.l.o.g. that is zero and for simplicity that to guarantee that it is never
pro9table to produce beyond capacity. Given costs, 9rms produce to satisfy demand, i.e. we
assume that 9rms cannot turn consumers away once they have named their prices. We follow
in this respect the de9nition of Bertrand competition suggested by Vives (1989) and endorsed
by Bulow, Geanakoplos & Klemperer (1985), Vives (1990), Kuhn (1994), Dastidar (1995, 1997)
and Maggi (1996). This assumption of automatically turns price competition into
quantity competition and therefore considerably eases the formal analysis of the capacity game.
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Proposition 1, Lemma 2 and 3 of the appendix prove this claim for vertical differentiation,
homogeneous good and horizontal differentiation respectively. We shall discuss at more length
this hypothesis of no rationing in section 5.
Having de9ned our game completely, we now review the standard quality-price game (i.e. we
neglect for the moment capacity commitment). This will provide a suitable benchmark for the
analysis of the full game. Consider the price stage where we denote by and with the
qualities chosen by the 9rms. Let us 9rst de9ne 9rmsE demand as they result from consumersE
choices given prices. Standard computations yield
if
if
if
if
Note that for demands to be well-de9ned, we need i.e. products cannot be ho-
mogeneous. Whenever 9rm has an incentive to reduce its price to obtain a pos-
itive demand. Hence only the 9rst segment of and are relevant. As a consequence
we focus exclusively on this case to identify 9rmsE best replies. The best reply functions in
this benchmark pricing game are and . They intersect at
which is the unique pure strategies price equilibrium. Demands
addressed to the 9rms at these prices are and . It then remains to
consider the 9rst stage of the game where qualities are chosen. In this no-commitment case, the
payoffs are
if
if
where and
If quality is costless then is in9nite and simple computations show that there exist two
subgame perfect equilibria. They involve one 9rm choosing the best available quality and the
other one optimally differentiating to a lower quality. Formally when
and are the only subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies. Similar
qualitative results are obtained when quality costs are taken into account ( ). One 9rm
then chooses a high quality whose level does not depend on the otherEs choice but solely on
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4. The Game with Capacity Commitment
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The apparent arbitrariness of setting a 9nite upper bound to qualities is now easy to justify: if cost matters
( ) no 9rm wishes to choose top quality. It is only for the limit that there is a problematic tendency
to adopt an in9nite quality.
costs (numerically : ). The other 9rmEs quality is increasing, concave and
converges very slowly towards the limit as tends to zero. Given our assumption on the
range of admissible qualities, the previous results are depicted on Figure 1.
Let us summarize this section. The quality-price game studied here is similar to the battle
of the sexes where one player chooses his most preferred action (a high quality) while the other
accommodates with a lower quality. This illustrates the so-called Gprinciple of differentiationG.
We consider now the full game where 9rms are allowed to commit to capacities before price
competition takes place. We solve the corresponding three stage game by backward induction.
We start by analyzing pricing games where 9rms have committed to qualities and with
and then to capacities and . Note 9rst that the assumption of no rationing and
imply that a 9rm will not 9nd it pro9table to name a price such that given the otherEs
price, it sells beyond capacity. Thus whenever 9rm prefers to stick to its
capacity by naming the price which solves The best reply functions are thus
if
if
(3)
if
if
(4)
5
AB
C
D
Proof
 
   
   
     
Lemma 1.
Proposition 1.



  





 



 






( )
4
2 ( )
4 4
2
4
( )
2
2 ( )
2
(1 )
2
2
4
( )
2
( )
2 4 2
(1 )
2 2


(3) (4)
[ ] = =
[ ] = (1 ) = (1 )
[ ] = (1 2 ) = ( )
[ ] = (1 ) = (1 )
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
( )
l h l
h l
h h l
h l
h
h l
h
h l
l h l
h l
h h l
h l
h h
h l
h
h l
l h l
h l
h l
h l
h
h l
h l l
h l
h h
h l
h l l
h l
D p
p h
D
l
p , p k k
p k , p k k k
p k , p s k s k k
p k k s , p k s k s k k
A
k
B k C

D
k , k , s , s
A, B, C D
l k A
B
h l h
l
l l
A
l
s s s
s s
A
h
s s s
s s l
s
s s h
s
s s
B
l h
s s s
s s
B
h h
s s s
s s l
k s
s s h
s
s s
C
l l
s s s
s s
C
h h l l
s s
s s l
s
s s h
s k s
s s
D
l h l l
D
h h h l l l
k s
s s h
s k s
s s
h
l
h
h l h l
h
The Nash equilibrium of the price game is
if and
if and
if and
if and
There exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium in the capacity game replicat-
ing Cournot outcomes under quality differentiation.
Existence of a pure strategy equilibrium follows from the fact that 9rms always produce to
satisfy demand. In this case indeed, no rationing can occur so that the typical non-concavities
associated with Bertrand-Edgeworth competition are ruled out from the outset. More precisely,
observe that is linear decreasing for low Es and then steeper, thus is concave. The
average over the distribution of is also concave, hence 9rm plays a pure strategy. Given
this fact, needs to be analyzed only on the domain where it is positive so that is also
concave and 9rm is playing a pure strategy. Uniqueness of the equilibrium follows then from
the presence of product differentiation.
According to equations and there are four possible candidate equilibria involving
either no 9rm, one 9rm, or two 9rms, selling at their full installed capacity. These equilibria as
well as the parameter constellations in which they apply are given hereafter.
In region installed capacities are large enough to sustain the standard Nash equilibrium in
prices identi9ed in the previous section (i.e., without capacity constraints). When decreases
we enter area while if decreases we enter area ; in both cases the low capacity 9rm
sticks to its capacity while the other keep playing along its standard best reply . Finally, in
region both 9rms sell their capacity at the highest possible price: they virtually mimic the
behavior of the Walrasian auctioneer. Given the capacities that have been installed, the Nash
equilibrium is given by the pair of prices which Gclear the marketG i.e., for which demands equal
capacities. It is in this sense that price competition without rationing is similar to Cournot
competition.
Lemma 1 shows that any con9guration of parameters de9nes a unique Nash
equilibrium in the corresponding pricing game. We can go backward in the game tree to consider
the game of capacity choices. We prove in Proposition 1 that it possesses a unique equilibrium
that enables us to easily study how qualities are chosen in the 9rst stage.
On Figure 2 below the frontiers of the four areas and are the thin plain
lines. Let us consider 9rst the best reply of 9rm against . The payoffs in region and
do not depend on capacity levels. Thus the presence of an arbitrarily small cost to capacity
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installation induces 9rm to move to the frontier with region and as seen on Figure 2
below (recall that payoffs are continuous throughout regions). In region , the payoff to 9rm
is so that the best reply against is . In region , the payoff
is leading to the best reply . The last step is to compare the
respective merits of those two best reply candidates; letting solve
we obtain
if
if
(4.1)
A similar analysis shows that 9rm Es best reply is de9ned in regions and as
if
if
(4.2)
where solves The best reply functions (displayed in bold on
Figure 2) are discontinuous but this does not prevent the existence of a unique pure strategy
equilibrium in the capacity game. The solution of system is and .
This equilibrium lies in the interior of region as and Figure 2 below
summarizes our 9ndings.
In order to establish the equivalence of this equilibrium with Cournot outcomes, observe
that the demand system de9ned by equations (1) and (2) is invertible and yield the system
characterizing the price equilibrium of region i.e., and as functions of quantity variables
and . Solving for a Nash equilibrium of this new quantity game we obtain .
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Recall that our analysis is valid only when qualities are strictly different.
Indeed the monopoly price is yielding a payoff of . Hence the FOC for optimal quality choice is
and leads to .
The Nash equilibrium of the quality game with Commitment and quality cost
factor is asymmetric: One rm chooses a high quality almost identical to the monopoly
choice while the other differentiates to .
This proposition has therefore established that
. This result is reminiscent of Kreps
& Scheinkman (1983).
It then remains to consider the 9rst stage of the game where qualities are chosen. The
payoff arising from the capacity equilibrium are for the high quality
9rm and for the low quality one. When quality is not costly ( large), it
is straightforward to see that the 9rm exhibiting the high quality will choose the highest possible
quality because . This is exactly what happened when no capacity commitment was
available.
We may then focus on the best reply of 9rm against . Recall that in the absence
of capacity commitment, it is well known that the low quality 9rm optimally differentiates to
On the contrary, we show hereafter in proposition 2 that the ability to commit to a
given capacity is so powerful as a mean of limiting price competition that there is no need
to differentiate anymore. Formally, when cost for quality is low we obtain : the low
quality 9rm imitates the high quality one. When quality is more costly, the low quality 9rm
differentiates but less than in the no-commitment game. Proposition 2 states this result in the
general case of positive and convex cost to quality.
The pro9t function of 9rm in the quality game (with commitment) is
if
if
Observe that for the high quality 9rm and
thus the solution of is a maximum of and is increasing with . Furthermore
implies that over the domain , the high quality
9rm choose a quality above the monopoly one
On the other hand we have for the low quality 9rm: and
If is so large that the low quality 9rm tries to imitate the high
quality one over the domain because is convex. For a higher cost of quality (lower
), the solution of lies between and and is a decreasing function of
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Comparing the payoff and we are able to determine the point
at which the best reply of 9rm jumps down. The intuition is easy to understand: as long as
is low 9rm is better off leading the game by choosing a large quality that is even greater than
the monopoly choice . When is large a similarly high quality leads to losses because of the
9erce quantity competition, thus 9rm optimally differentiates to a low level. Figure 3a below
displays over and over for .
Displaying both best reply functions on Figure 3b above we see that (we check
numerically that it holds true whatever ) thus there exists two asymmetric pure strategy
equilibria in the 9rst stage where qualities are chosen.
We now study the equilibrium as a function of the cost parameter . Although is a
4 degree polynomial equation, it can be solved analytically. Let us denote the unique
root among the four possible ones that lies in . The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
the whole game is the solution of This equation is obviously not solvable
analytically but can be solved numerically to yield a unique equilibrium. The choice of the high
quality 9rm is . We then derive which is increasing, convex
and reaches the top level at
Figure 4 summarizes our 9ndings and compare them to the no-commitment case.
denotes the low quality equilibrium choice in the no-commitment case whereas applies for
the commitment case.
9
66
11F >
Proposition 3.
See Eaton & Harrald (1992) on this point when there is no cost to quality.
As the cost of quality decreases, the degree of quality differentiation slowly
decreases towards a positive level in the case whereas in the case
it quickly decreases towards zero.
Figure 4
Capacity
commitment and Bertrand competition systematically induce less product differentiation than
without the power to commit to a given capacity.
the ability to commit to capacities before Bertrand competition leaves no room
for quality differentiation as a way of relaxing competition.
As a direct consequence of Proposition 2 we may thus state our central result:
Further, if the cost of quality is below some
critical level then
no-commitment commitment
Proposition 1 told us that if 9rms can commit to capacities and play Bertrand competition
afterwards, we are literally back to a standard Cournot game at the quality stage. It is then
obvious that the incentives to differentiate that are left for are those prevailing under quantity
competition. Under Cournot competition, choosing a lower quality essentially amounts to enjoy
a lower residual demand against the otherEs quantity, which cannot be pro9table under the
assumption that quality is not too costly. In the case of negligible costs for quality ( ),
this is exactly what happens in our model. Given this marked tendency towards identical quality
choices in equilibrium we have to study the behavior of our model in the limiting case of no-
differentiation. In order to do this, a different analysis is called for since the analysis up to now
is only valid for differing qualities. In the next section, we develop the formal analysis of the
capacity-price game with Bertrand competition and homogeneous products.
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Capacity commitment and Bertrand price competition for an homogeneous
good yield
This (standard) convention simpli9es the exposition without affecting the nature of our results.
When identical qualities are chosen by 9rms in the 9rst stage, our model simpli9es to the linear
demand . We shall show later that choosing the best available quality is the only
GrobustG equilibrium of the full game with negligible quality costs. We therefore set to
ease the exposition of the capacity-price competition. Firms choose capacities and and
then compete in price. Recall that 9rms name prices and produce to satisfy demand. We assume
that in case of a tie, demand is split equally between the two 9rms.
Consider a subgame , the pro9t function for is
if
if and
if
if
Notice that a 9rmEs payoff is totally independent of the otherEs capacity in complete op-
position to Bertrand-Edgeworth models. Introducing quantitative restrictions while preventing
rationing has two direct effects. Because the Gno-rationingG rule prevents the existence of de-
mand spillovers, the kind of high price strategic deviation that generates price instability in
Bertrand-Edgeworth models is not at work in the present model. On the other hand, undercut-
ting the otherEs price may lead to huge losses if the capacity is low relative to the demand that
has to be served. Quite naturally, the strategy that will emerge in equilibrium consists in the
matching of the otherEs price in order to avoid being forced to fully serve market demand. As a
consequence, there will exist a continuum of Nash equilibria in the pricing game (as in Dastidar
(1997)) whose range will depend on 9rmsE capacities. Cournot prices but also Collusive ones
will belong to this continuum for a wide range of capacity levels, i.e. in many price subgames.
Regarding the incentives to capacity choices the intuition is then simple: a large capacity
makes undercutting attractive in the pricing game for a wide range of prices. Therefore, the
level of prices that can be sustained as equilibrium ones tend to be low when capacities are high.
On the other hand, choosing a too low capacity level does not allow to take the full bene9t
of sustaining identical prices in equilibrium. Equilibrium capacity choices are thus located Gin
betweenG. Cournot capacities can be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium but many other
capacities including the collusive ones are also equilibrium choices. The following proposition is
proved in Lemma 2 of the appendix.
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no-rationing
as a mean of relaxing price competition
A multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria
The Cournot equilibrium as a lower bound on equilibrium payoffs
The collusive outcome if the Pareto selection is used at the price stage
Studying the behavior of our model at the no-differentiation limit reveals how crucial is the
assumption of to the analysis. In differentiated markets, capacity commitment and
price competition without rationing force 9rms to play quantity competition because the rules
of the game leave them no other choice. Indeed, Proposition 1 proves this result for vertically
differentiated products but the same is true under horizontal differentiation as formally shown
in Lemma 3 of the appendix. The main problem with the no-rationing hypothesis is therefore
its lack of continuity at the limit when goods become homogeneous as illustrated by Proposition
4.
Proposition 4 also contrasts with Kreps & Scheinkman (1983) and the bulk of the literature on
capacity-price competition with rationing were uniqueness of equilibrium and Cournot outcome
is the rule while here the Cournot outcome is only the lower bound in terms of payoffs of a
continuum of equilibria.
We are now in a position to relate our analysis of the homogeneous case with Proposition 3.
Since we are dealing with continuous games the notion of trembling hand perfection is not well
de9ned meaning that we cannot formally prove the following claim.
Under Bertrand competition and low costs of quality, capacity commitment yields no
quality differentiation and collusion.
When small perturbations from and lead 9rms back to the
unique SPE which is therefore robust. However when both 9rms have a tendency
to imitate each other in quality. Yet any chosen by both 9rms along with collusive
capacities of form an SPE of since the best deviation that a 9rm can make is to choose
which yields the Cournot payoff in the unique continuation equilibrium of
Furthermore no 9rm gets an equilibrium payoff in lesser than . Our claim is supported by
limited rationality arguments and models of evolutionary game theory which tend to indicate
that players are able to coordinate on the equilibrium whose payoffs are Pareto-dominating. It
is therefore very likely that 9rms will increase quality and limit capacities if they anticipate that
they will play the Pareto price equilibrium described in Proposition 4.
In this article, we have shown that quality differentiation
was not a robust principle once capacity commitment is allowed. There exists a recent literature
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$The extent to which
rms can differentiate their products . . . determines the toughness of price competition$.
Proof
Capacity commitment and Bertrand price competition yield
a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria including the Cournot equilibrium
the collusive outcome if the Pareto selection is used at the price stage
which sees the mode of competition in the market as the result of a richer game. For instance
Maggi (1996) shows that the degree of competitiveness of equilibrium market outcomes can be
viewed as the result of capacity choices with limited commitment value. Motta & Polo (1999)
establish a similar result using product differentiation. They show that
The
present contribution clearly belongs to the same vein.
We have shown indeed that considering a richer game where capacity commitment is possible
sheds a new light on differentiation issues as well as on price competition. In our setting, capacity
commitment relaxes price competition so effectively that differentiation becomes unpro9table
(for large ). Two remarks are called for at this step. First, our result should not be viewed as
disqualifying vertical differentiation. It emphasizes rather the fact that quality differentiation
may rely more heavily on costs considerations than on a willingness to relax competition. Second,
Bertrand competition (as opposed to Bertrand-Edgeworth) appears to be central in obtaining
our minimum-differentiation principle so easily. Allowing for rationing severely complicates
the picture because non existence of pure strategy equilibrium is endemic in the corresponding
pricing games. Preliminary results obtained in a more simple setting (Boccard &Wauthy (1998))
suggest that our present 9ndings could indeed generalize to Bertrand-Edgeworth games. At this
step however, this remains an open conjecture.
From an empirical point of view our analysis suggests that in industries whose technology
exhibits rigid production capacities, quality differentiation should basically reOect costs dif-
ferentials so that if upgrading quality is not too costly, less product differentiation should be
observed.
: The proof is in four steps
Firm Es best reply in .
Two strategy pro9les are relevant: undercutting, or matching the otherEs price. Notice the
novelty here: undercutting may be less pro9table than matching because this may entail losses
on units sold beyond capacities.
Observing that , hence undercutting a price lesser
than yields negative pro9ts. Likewise implies that
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matching the otherEs price yields negative pro9ts whenever . For ,
both undercutting and matching yield negative pro9ts so that the best reply is any higher
price. The price that leaves 9rm indifferent between matching and not being GconstrainedG
and undercutting while being constrained is the negative root of equation
which is so that 9rm is indeed not constrained. When
(this is meaningful for only) matching leads to a constrained
capacity but is still better than undercutting by continuity. Noticing 9nally that
the best reply function is
if
if
if
for
Analysis of the symmetric price equilibria and of the Pareto correspondence..
For asymmetric capacities with , a continuum of symmetric equilibria exists
over the segment
When capacities are not too dissimilar is non void; otherwise the equilibria are
asymmetric. Firm plays any in and 9rm plays for any small positive
Firm obtains a zero pro9t in these equilibria.
The multiplicity of equilibria might be problematic for going backward in the game tree. We
rely on bounded recall and limited rationality arguments like those of Aumann & Sorin (1989)
to select the Pareto dominant equilibrium from the Nash correspondence. This equilibrium is
either the purely collusive one or as close as possible to it.
If the equilibrium payoff of 9rm and are and
thus coordinating to a higher price is Pareto dominating. If , so that the
Pareto dominant equilibrium is the price in that is the nearest to the
monopoly price When all prices larger than lead to Pareto optimal
equilibrium outcomes because 9rm is paid and wishes to increase while 9rm
is paid and wish to decrease toward the monopoly price. This will not be a problem
because the incentive for 9rm will be to raise
Observe that for and implies ,
thus the Pareto dominant price when capacities are large is the upper bound Over the
complementary domain where so that the monopoly price is
reachable if To sum up the Pareto dominant price selection is
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The capacity equilibrium is collusive
Consider 9rm Es best reply against . If 9rm is paid independently of its
own capacity and should thus reduce it as soon as there is a in9nitesimal but positive cost to
capacity installation. If then 9rm is paid one half of the monopoly pro9t minus its
capacity cost which should be optimally set at If then for any
there is a symmetric equilibrium that pays thus 9rm can
pro9tably deviate to the argument maximizer of
Multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria
If we nevertheless insist on considering all price equilibria there will obviously exist a con-
tinuum of SPE. For instance the Cournot quantities may be sustain as follow. On the
equilibrium path, there exist symmetrical price equilibria in the range
which includes the Cournot price If a 9rm deviates to a larger capacity then the upper bound
of increases thus we may select the price equilibrium at the lower bound to GpunishG the
deviant. If a 9rm deviates downward then the lower bound of equal to increases.
If then we may select the price equilibrium at the lower bound to punish the deviant.
Because the demand addressed to 9rm is thus its equilibrium payoff is
the Cournot payoff. If is so small that
then 9rm nets zero pro9t in any ensuing price equilibrium.
In the following lemma we consider an horizontally differentiated market adapted from Maggi
(96) whose demand function for 9rm is with and
Observing that the analogy with the classical
aggregate demand for homogeneous goods leads us to set
so that there is no scope for varying the degree of differentiation. Instead we will consider an
horizontally differentiated market with a substitutability parameter de9ned to .
To keep the exposition simple we take the demand addressed to 9rm to be
although a smooth function with and
would be more realistic but less tractable.
The technology of 9rms are now described. The marginal cost of production below capacity
is . The unit cost of capacity installation is and the marginal cost of producing beyond
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Capacity commitment and Bertrand price competition in an horizontally differen-
tiated market yield Cournot competition if and equilibrium capacities
otherwise. The Bertrand (competitive) outcome is reached at
As goods become homogeneous , and increase toward the Cournot
level that is characteristic of the homogeneous goods model while if the equilibrium
quantity tends to which is the individual (purely) competitive quantity for .
capacity is where measures legal and technical costs associated to the production
of units beyond capacity. The Cournot quantity is and the Cournot price is
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2 but easier since differentiation smooth things
out. We 9rst solve the pricing game for any pair and then analyze the capacity game.
Solving for yields The pro9t function in the
pricing game is
if
if
Notice that if if thus the best reply is any larger price. The
unconstrained maximizer of is (the traditional Bertrand best-
reply). For this price to be eligible two conditions must be satis9ed: it must yield a positive
demand and it must be larger than . The 9rst condition is true because
while the second is correct if The unconstrained argmax of
for is which guarantees a positive demand and is lesser
than if For values of in between the best reply is to stick to
the capacity by playing Therefore the best reply function is
if
if
For a large , a price greater than would yield a nil demand for 9rm
thus the last entry of will never be relevant. If then , thus 9rm
will never play such a low price and
A symmetric equilibrium may involves non binding capacities if those are large; it is the
traditional Bertrand competition. The solution of is . This price is
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The role of investment in entry deterrence
eligible if for The left inequality is always true while the
other one necessitates and larger than The equilibrium payoff is , hence
both 9rms have an incentive to decrease their capacity down to
At the opposite extreme the equilibrium may involve sales in excess of capacities if the latter
are small. The solution of is . This price is eligible if and
are lesser than The equilibrium payoff is thus both 9rms
have an incentive to increase their capacity up to
The last candidate symmetric equilibrium is the solution of .
This is the Cournot system of prices ; it holds when and
are between and The 9rst period payoff function that we deduce from
this equilibrium is and the best reply at the capacity stage is
. The 9xed point of this best reply operator is
From the analysis of the 3 preceding points we deduce that the Cournot quantity is the
unique symmetric SPE if it lies between and The 9rst condition is always true
while the second leads to the Cournot price. If the
unique symmetric SPE involves capacities equal to .
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